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ABSTRACT
Increasingly, large systems and data centers are being built in a ’scale out’
manner, i.e. using large numbers of commodity hardware components in-
stead of traditional ’scale up’ using expensive, specialized equipment. How-
ever, large numbers of commodity components imply higher rates of failure
across such systems. Such failures can cause applications to miss their dead-
lines for task completion. For this reason, cloud service providers and cloud
applications must anticipate failures and engineer their services accordingly.
In this thesis, we ﬁrst analyze the availability of a commodity data center
designed for MapReduce applications. MapReduce is increasingly used in
industry for eﬃcient large scale data processing tasks including personal ad-
vertising, spam detection, as well as data mining. We show how MapReduce
software level fault tolerance can be used to achieve the same availability as
scale up data centers. Second, we extend existing job schedulers for deadline-
driven jobs to handle machine and software failures and satisfy the service
level objectives.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has recently become a mainstream commodity in the IT
industry [1]. Computing that was once done locally is now being done in the
cloud. But as more and more services are pushed into the cloud, the size of
the cloud infrastructures and the data is growing rapidly. Hence the demand
for scalable systems capable of accommodating and computing petabytes of
data.
One of the major challenges for top cloud providers and data centers is
availability. High availability is a major requirement in modern business
applications, cloud customers would not move to cloud unless there is a clear
analysis of availability in service level objectives (SLO). Accordingly, Highly-
available and scalable storage and computation systems are a key component
of such environments. Availability analysis of data centers helps engineers
to better understand the architecture and conﬁguration of their data centers
and allows them to improve their systems. From the cloud customer point
of view, availability along the price are two main factors to make a decision
of moving to cloud and choosing the right provider.
A complex storage system presents many design challenges in addressing
scalability and availability; it becomes important especially in cloud infras-
tructure where highly-dependable servers are not generally accessible or ﬁ-
nancially unfeasible.
In recent years new storage and computation solutions has been developed,
many of them like MapReduce are designed to be deployed in data centers
with commodity hardware. As a result, there has been a growth in number
of public and private Hadoop data centers, an open source implementation
of MapReduce which allows users to store petabytes of data on commodity
servers and provides an easy to use computational platform for big data.
However, as a commodity hardware data centers grow, so does the over-
all system dependability of equipment failure or software bugs in the data
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center. Applications not only need to prepare for occasional failures of the
infrastructure, they need to expect diﬀerent types of failures (ranging from
hard drive errors to crash of whole racks) and combinations of them as part
of an application’s normal operating procedure [2]. Combinations of failures
may have a major impact on performance of an application, sometimes even
leading to applications being temporarily out of service [3].
In this thesis, ﬁrst, in Chapter 2, we analyze the availability of data cen-
ters designed for simultaneous storage and computation. These data centers
are deployed on commodity hardware and are running MapReduce jobs. We
discus how the availability of these data centers has been increased by soft-
ware solutions. Next, in Chapter 3, we introduce an assessment and proﬁling
tool for study of failures in Hadoop clusters. And ﬁnally, in Chapter 4, we
propose a reactive solution to mask the eﬀect of failures for MapReduce jobs
to satisfy diﬀerent service level objectives (SLOs).
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Chapter 2
AVAILABILITY OF MAPREDUCE DATA
CENTERS
2.1 Motivation and Background
With the increasing volume of data and industry tendency to store and com-
pute the data, new data center designs are more focused on providing ﬁ-
nancially feasible solutions. Now, companies and individuals are able to use
commodity hardware data centers to store and process their data.
Consequences of data centers running on commodity hardware are higher
rate of failure and lower rate of availability. However, new software tech-
nologies try to increase the availability of data centers through software
redundancy rather than premium hardware. As an example of such new
technologies, Hadoop provides a higher available data center comparing to
commodity data centers which are not running this software.
Apache Hadoop is a framework for running applications on large cluster
built of commodity hardware. The Hadoop framework transparently provides
applications both reliability and data motion. Hadoop implements a com-
putational paradigm named MapReduce, where the application is divided
into many small fragments of work, each of which may be executed or re-
executed on any node in the cluster. In addition, it provides a distributed ﬁle
system (HDFS) that stores data on the compute nodes, providing very high
aggregate bandwidth across the cluster. Both MapReduce and the Hadoop
Distributed File System are designed so that node failures are automatically
handled by the framework [4].
In Hadoop, hardware failure is the norm rather than the exception. An
HDFS instance may consist of hundreds or thousands of server machines, each
storing part of the data. The fact that there are a huge number of components
and that each component has a non-trivial probability of failure means that
some component of HDFS is always non-functional. Therefore, detection of
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faults and quick, automatic recovery from them is a core architectural goal
of HDFS [4].
To reduce the complexity, Hadoop design is being implemented on a generic
data center models. In this study we use available designs like Google data
center [2]. Hadoop data centers are usually based on a hierarchical data
center design, what is diﬀerent comparing to general designs is the role of
machines. In this section, ﬁrst we brieﬂy review the software level design
of a Hadoop clusters, then we go over the data center deployment and role
management.
The MapReduce model [5], consists of two computation functions: map
and reduce. The map function takes an input key/value pair and produces a
list of intermediate key/value pairs. The intermediate values associated with
the same key are grouped together and then passed to the reduce function.
The reduce function takes intermediate key with a list of values and processes
them to form a new list of values.
map(k1, v1)→ list(k2, v2)
reduce(k2, list(v2))→ list(v3)
MapReduce jobs are distributed and executed across multiple machines; the
map stage is partitioned into map tasks and the reduce stage is partitioned
into reduce tasks. Each map task processes a part of input data: it reads
data, applies the user-deﬁned map function on each record, and writes the
intermediate data to the local disk for diﬀerent reduce tasks. The reduce
stage consists of two phases: shuﬄe and reduce phase. In the shuﬄe phase,
intermediate data produced by map tasks will be fetched. All intermediate
will be sorted. In case the intermediate data does not ﬁt in memory, in an
external merge sort stage, the intermediate data will be shuﬄed, merged in
memory, and written to disk. After all the intermediate data is shuﬄed,
all the sorted ﬁles will be merged. Finally, in the reduce phase, the sorted
intermediate data is passed to the user-deﬁned reduce function. The output
from the reduce function is generally written back to the distributed ﬁle
system.
In Hadoop implementation, job scheduling is performed by a master node,
which manages a number of worker nodes. Master node is also responsible
for storing data on Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). Based on the
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Figure 2.1: Typical Hadoop Cluster.
implementation these functionalities might have been decided into Name
Node and Job Tracker. Worker Nodes make up the vast majority of machines
and do all the work of storing the data and running the computations. Each
worker communicates with and receive instructions from their master nodes.
In order to submit Map Reduce jobs describing how that data should
be processed, dedicated client machines have Hadoop installed with all the
cluster settings. Their role is to load data into the cluster and submit Map
Reduce jobs.
Figure 2.1 shows a typical Hadoop cluster. Rack servers are connected to
a top of rack switch; the rack switch has uplinks connected to another tier
of switches. The majority of the servers are worker nodes with lots of local
disk storage and moderate amounts of CPU and Memory.
Hadoop chops a huge chunk of data into small chunks and spread it out
over many machines, map and reduce tasks process their portion of the data
in parallel.
For fault tolerance, Hadoop, replicates every block of data on multiple
machines avoid data loss. Each block will be replicated in the cluster as its
loaded. The standard setting for Hadoop is to have 3 copies of each block
in the cluster. This can be conﬁgured with the dfs.replication parameter in
the ﬁle hdfs-site.xml. In default implementation, data will be broken into
multiple blocks and each block, will be replicated on 3 machines. Hadoop
has the concept of “Rack Awareness”; meaning racks and server locations
can be manually deﬁned in the system. There are two key reasons for this:
Data loss prevention, and network performance. As each block of data will
be replicated to multiple machines to prevent the failure of one machine from
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losing all copies of data. One replication will be stored in another rack in
case that rack experiences a failure such as a switch failure or power failure.
Knowing where servers are located in the network topology will help master
node to make an intelligent decision about where data replicas should exist
in the cluster. There is also an assumption that two machines in the same
rack have more bandwidth and lower latency between each other than two
machines in two diﬀerent racks.
2.2 Model Description
In this section, we explain the Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) model of a
data center at diﬀerent levels. First we explain the motivation behind reward
function then we model a server then a rack and later a data center. It should
be noted that failure rates and repair rates have exponential distribution.
2.2.1 Reward Function
We want to measure the availability of the system. So we measure the state
of the system to see whether it is in operation or has failed. For instance the
reward function for the server considering the working state of processors is
as if processors− > system fail− > Mark() == 0 then reward+ = 1.0;.
To measure the availability, we use this reward function and calculate the
mean and variance of system fail over certain period of time.
2.2.2 Single Server Model
To decrease the number of generated states, we model a server with compo-
nents which are more likely to fail and could be replaced easily. This assump-
tion that a server is limited to these components is valid since components
that are not modeled are required to be replaced with other components like
the main board, therefore we consider the board as the main component.
In table 2.1 the components in the server model with their failure rates
and repair rates are mentioned. In this model, at least 15 disks (RAID 5), 2
CPUs, 1 board, 1 controller and 1 power should be operating otherwise the
server fails.
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Table 2.1: Server components.
Component Units Failure rate Repair Rate
Disks 16 1/87600 1/2
CPU 4 1/131000 1/5
RAID Controller 2 1/255000 1/8
Power 2 1/84000 1
Board 1 1/98000 1/8
Figure 2.2: SAN model for processor.
The SAN model for processors are shown in ﬁgure 2.2, and the composed
model in 2.3.
2.2.3 Rack Model
For the rack model, in order to decrease the number of states we assume server
as one entity with the failure rate close to min failure rate of components.
Also, as system scales, repair will take longer time for servers. The other
major component in a rack is Top of the Rack (ToR) router which is also
included in this model. In table 2.2 the components in the rack model with
their failure rates and repair rates are mentioned. Figure 2.4 shows the model
for a server in rack and ﬁgure 2.5 shows the rack composed model. In this
model, at least 8 servers and 1 router should be operating otherwise the rack
fails. It should be noted that there is no redundancy for routers in commodity
data center designs.
Figure 2.3: Server composed model.
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Table 2.2: Rack components.
Component Units Failure rate Repair Rate
Server 10 1/45753 1/5
Router 1 1/141000 1/8
Figure 2.4: SAN model for a server in a rack.
2.2.4 Data Center Model
Data center is the most challenging component, because of rack replications
we have exponential increase in the number generated states. Therefore, we
have only considered a data center with 2 racks which is a smallest possible
Hadoop cluster with 3 replication constraint. The composed model is shown
in ﬁgure 2.6.
2.3 Results
We ran the experiments using TransientSolver for a period of 8760 hours
(1 year). Availability of a single server, rack and a data center with 2 racks
are computed in table 2.3.
The results show that using commodity hardware over a period of 1 year
with periodical repair and maintenance, we expect downtime of 43 minutes
for a server, 30 minutes for a rack with 10 server (2 redundant) and 18 minutes
for a data center with 2 racks and 4 server redundancy. In this model we
assumed that the data center is under periodical repair which is not the case
Figure 2.5: Rack composed model.
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Figure 2.6: Data center composed model.
Table 2.3: Availability of data center components.
Component Generated States Mean Variance
Single server 1530 0.9933182 8.174664E-005
Rack 22 0.9934433 5.673209E-005
Data center (2 rack) 506 0.993266 6.806655E-005
in many small data centers when the company contracts another company
for longer period of time, like monthly maintenance. In other words, it is
true that you can pay a signiﬁcant premium for hardware with a high mean
time to failure (MTTF). However, working with big data requires thousands
of disks and servers. Even an MTTF of 4 years would cause about 5 failures
per week in a cluster of 1,000 nodes. With less money, using commodity
hardware with an MTTF of 2 years, we can expect about 10 failures per
week. Which shows they both require same amount of energy to design a
fault tolerant system. So it motivates us to provide fault tolerance through
software.
Considering the downtime, the challenge for Hadoop or any other data
center software platform on top of commodity hardware is how to increase the
availability through software. In Hadoop, the fault tolerance mechanism is
based on replicating data on diﬀerent servers. Table 2.4 shows the comparison
of commodity data center availability with Hadoop cluster.
2.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, industry is moving toward store and process all the data they
can get their hands on, which motivates much cheaper and more scalable
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Table 2.4: Availability of commodity data center components and Hadoop
cluster.
Component Generated States Mean Variance
Data center (2 rack) 506 0.993266 6.806655E-005
Hadoop with 3 replication 1108 0.999778 8.174664E-005
Hadoop with 4 replication 1310 0.999901 5.673209E-005
solutions comparing to premium and reliable data center. Commodity hard-
ware data centers are feasible for anyone in terms of price and scalability,
however, reliability and availability in these data centers must come
from software.
Hadoop fault tolerance is based on making 3 replications of each chunk of
data and store them on diﬀerent servers and racks, a redundancy which is
provisioned at the software level. With default replication of 3 we can achieve
much higher availability, however, we would dedicate signiﬁcant disk space
for these replications. In Hadoop clusters, there is a trade-oﬀ between avail-
ability and disk space. User can choose the number of replications according
to their requirements; if processing particular data is critical, user should
increase the number of replications, hence, allocate extra space to that data.
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Chapter 3
FAILURE SCENARIO AS A SERVICE FOR
HADOOP CLUSTERS
3.1 Motivation
Cloud computing has recently become a mainstream commodity in the IT
industry [1]. Consequently, the impact on overall system dependability of
equipment failure or software bugs in the cloud infrastructure has increased.
Applications not only need to prepare for occasional failures of their cloud
infrastructure, they need to expect diﬀerent types of failures (ranging from
hard drive errors to crash of whole racks) and combinations of them as part
of an application’s normal operating procedure [2]. Combinations of failures
may have a major impact on performance of an application, sometimes even
leading to applications being temporarily out of service [3]. Unfortunately,
the use of small sandbox-testing models is not suﬃcient to predict the eﬀects
of failures on realistic applications running on large cloud-based infrastruc-
tures.
A few teams have proposed failure injection as a possible way to address
the reliability challenges of cloud infrastructures. The ﬁrst publicized system
developed speciﬁcally for failure injection in cloud computing infrastructure
is the “Chaos Monkey” (ChM) from Netﬂix [6], which was recently open-
sourced (July 2012). In ChM, a simple failure model (namely a whole node
failure) is simulated across a virtual cluster running in the Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). The model injects a continuous sequence of
failures into the Amazon auto-scaling group service, causing frequent failures
of diﬀerent nodes within the infrastructure in order to identify weaknesses in
the applications that run on it.
Later, Gunawi et al. introduced “Failure as a Service” (FaaS) as an ap-
proach to the challenge, and proposed a basic design for such a service [7].
Their motivation stemmed from the ChM system, and they intended to build
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upon that idea.
Both of the previous eﬀorts simulated certain failure modes, for example,
crashing of a node. However, real-world faults and errors result in many
diverse failure scenarios, potentially including combinations of diﬀerent fail-
ure modes [8]. In addition, many failures in a cloud environment tend to
cascade from being small problems to being large problems very quickly [3].
Therefore, we believe that a system designed to assess the real-world depend-
ability of a cloud-based system is needed, and that a failure system should be
able to handle complex fault and error injection scenarios and also simulate
combinations of diﬀerent failure modes.
In this paper, we introduce a Failure Scenario as a Service (FSaaS) model,
designed and implemented for Hadoop clusters. Our FSaaS model can cur-
rently be used by cloud service providers and clients who rely on Hadoop
MapReduce clusters. By targeting Hadoop, we aim to provide FSaaS ser-
vices to a wide spectrum of users. Consider that an average of one thou-
sand MapReduce jobs were executed on Google’s clusters every day in 2008,
and that more than ten thousand distinct MapReduce programs were imple-
mented internally at Google in a four-year period [5]. There exist many types
of Hadoop workloads [9], and this paper shows that for the workloads we
study, they behave very diﬀerently under various failure scenarios. Because
it is diﬃcult to design general failure scenarios that ﬁt all types of Hadoop
workloads, we proﬁle the behavior of several diﬀerent Hadoop workload types
against failures and generate a series of template failure scenarios that have
high impact on these particular job types. As an example, in Section 3.4 we
compare data-intensive application versus CPU-intensive application work-
load behavior under diﬀerent failures and ﬁnd that the behaviors are diﬀerent
in important ways. Using those scenarios, we are creating an FSaaS model
that would allow users of Hadoop clusters to pick the proper template failure
scenario to run against their applications. Failures in the model are random-
ized and are synthetically introduced into components, allowing a Hadoop
application to see a series of failures that simulate real-world failures. Our
tools can also inject real faults into running Hadoop applications, as a mech-
anism to best mimic real-world dependability challenges.
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 3.2, we will
talk about related work in this area and compare it to our own work. In
Section 3.3, we will discuss our methodology and the design of the experiment
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we conducted. Section 3.4 describes experimental results. We conclude in
Section 3.5.
3.2 Related Work
When Netﬂix moved from their own data centers to Amazon Web Services,
they developed Chaos Monkey [6] in order to evaluate how potential failures
in AWS would aﬀect their ability to provide continuous services. Chaos
Monkey would kill EC2 instances to test how they aﬀected overall services
to clients. Netﬂix performed the tests in real scale, enabling them to ﬁnd the
bottlenecks in their system and areas where improvements were necessary.
Because failures in data centers are common [2], this type of testing will be
important for most organizations running their services on the cloud.
Dinu et al. performed an evaluation of Hadoop’s performance under com-
pute node and process failures [3]. They observed that even single failures
had detrimental eﬀects on running times of jobs. It was observed that several
design decisions in Hadoop, such as delayed speculative execution (SE), the
lack of sharing of failure information, and overloading of connection failure
semantics, make Hadoop’s performance sluggish in the presence of failures.
Jin et al. derived a stochastic model to predict the performance of MapRe-
duce applications under failures [10]. They generated synthetic data to run
their MapReduce simulator to conﬁrm the accuracy of their model.
[11, 12] present tools for eﬃcient injection of failures into cloud software
systems, like HDFS, and evaluation of cloud recovery. Cloud software sys-
tems like Hadoop include fault tolerance and failure recovery, but some fail-
ures may have unpredictable eﬀects on performance of Hadoop [3]. Also,
some failures may not be accounted for when failure recovery is implemented
in cloud software systems; or failure recovery may even be buggy [3]. Hence,
[11] is based on the need for state-of-the-art failure-testing techniques. The
authors address the challenges of dealing with combinatorial explosion of
multiple failures through their work in PreFail [11]. PreFail is a pro-
grammable failure injection tool that provides failure abstractions to let
testers write policies to prune down large spaces of multiple-failure com-
binations. The main goal of PreFail is to ﬁnd reliability bugs in large-scale
distributed systems. [12] presents a similar tool called Fate, a framework for
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cloud recovery testing. Fate is designed to systematically push cloud sys-
tems into many possible failure scenarios. Similar to [11], Fate aims to solve
the challenge of massive combinatorial explosion of failures by implementing
smart and eﬃcient exploration strategies of multiple-failure scenarios. Fate
achieves fast exploration of failure scenarios by using strategies that prior-
itize failure scenarios that result in distinct recovery actions. In summary,
PreFail [11] and Fate [12] are tools that allow users to inject failures into
cloud systems to analyze their failure recovery. They both aim to solve the
challenge of combinatorial explosion of multiple failures, PreFail through
pruning policies and Fate through prioritization strategies. However Fate
is deployed in only three cloud systems (HDFS, ZooKeeper, and Cassandra)
and their systematic behavior during failure scenarios. Instead, we focus on
failure impact on jobs running on Hadoop as a more high-level framework.
Our approach is to systematically analyze the MapReduce jobs rather than
the frameworks.
3.3 FSaaS Design
Our goal is to implement FSaaS for Hadoop clusters by designing a set of
failure scenarios that contain collections of eﬀective failures for speciﬁc types
of applications. FSaaS and the scenarios can be used by organizations as
a Quality Control tool to improve their applications. Also, it can be used
as a method of determining upper bounds on required resources for appli-
cations with possibilities of failure during operation, to satisfy service-level
agreements (SLA).
We ﬁrst identiﬁed a set of various common failures that may aﬀect Hadoop
jobs, described in Section 3.3.1. Then we evaluated eﬀects of individual fail-
ures on diﬀerent types of job, and evaluated the performance of the jobs
against the failures and a combination of them. As a result, we have devel-
oped a set of sample scenarios (described in Section 3.3.2) for a few diﬀerent
types of workloads (Section 3.3.3).
To make eﬃcient use of the FSaaS service, we allow users to ﬁnd a failure
template to evaluate their job by selecting a job type (I/O intensive, CPU
intensive, or Network intensive) and appropriate matching failure scenario
for their particular Hadoop job. The template injects the set of failures into
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a Hadoop cluster, and helps the users to identify weaknesses, bottlenecks,
and hot spots in their application in the presence of failures.
Next we describe the failure injection framework, the diﬀerent MapReduce
applications representing MapReduce job types in our case study, the utilized
evaluation metrics, and our experimental testbed.
3.3.1 Failure Injection Framework
We are using AnarchyApe [13] as our failure injection base code. AnarchyApe
is an open-source project, created by Yahoo!, developed to inject failures in
Hadoop clusters. About ten common failures have been implemented in
AnarchyApe, and more can be added. Each failure in AnarchyApe is imple-
mented as a failure command. In our templates, we execute these commands
to inject the failures into nodes in the Hadoop cluster (see Section 3.3.2).
Here are some common failures in Hadoop environments, proposed in [13]:
• Data node is killed
• Application Master (AM) is killed
• Application Master is suspended
• Node Manager (NM) is killed
• Node Manager is suspended
• Data node is suspended
• Tasktracker is suspended
• Node panics and restarts
• Node hangs and does not restart
• Random thread within data node is killed
• Random thread within data node is suspended
• Random thread within tasktracker is killed
• Random thread within tasktracker is suspended
• Network becomes slow
• Network is dropping signiﬁcant numbers of packets
• Network disconnect (simulate cable pull)
• One disk gets VERY slow
• CPU hog consumes x% of CPU cycles
• Mem hog consumes x% of memory
• Corrupt ext3 data block on disk
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• Corrupt ext3 metadata block on disk
In our case studies, we have used a handful of these possible failures (Sec-
tion 3.4).
3.3.2 Failure Scenarios
Currently, to create a scenario, the user constructs a shell script specifying
the types of errors to be injected or failures to be simulated, one after another.
A sample line in a scenario ﬁle could be as follows:
java -jar ape.jar --remote cluster-ip-list.xml
-fb lambda -k lambda
where the -fb is a “Fork Bomb” injection, the -k is a “Kill One Node”
command, and the lambda speciﬁes the failure rates.
Users can deﬁne lambda parameters by computing Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) of a system. MTBF is deﬁned to be the average (or ex-
pected) lifetime of a system and is one of the key decision-making criteria for
data center infrastructure systems [14]. Equipment in data centers is going
to fail, and MTBF helps with predicting which systems are the likeliest to fail
at any given moment. Based on previous failure statistics, users can develop
an estimate of MTBF for various equipment failures; however, determining
MTBFs for many software failures is challenging.
To evaluate our case studies in this paper, we have developed a set of
ready-to-use failure scenarios. However, the easy programmability of FSaaS
ensures its use in other use cases. Users can create user-deﬁned scenarios;
as an example, a user can categorize data center failures into two groups:
equipment failures and HDFS failures, and use their known failure rates or
some publicly available reports in order to set lambda parameters. Some
publicly available data for data center failures in Google can be ﬁnd at [15]
and for HDFS failures from Hortonworks at [16].
3.3.3 MapReduce Applications
At Google alone [5], more than ten thousand distinct MapReduce programs
have been implemented; hence, for the FSaaS to be applicable to all types of
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programs, good program classiﬁcations are needed. We categorize MapRe-
duce programs as network-(data transfer), CPU-(computation), or I/O-(local
data access) intensive.
We have used the following representative applications for the above resource-
intensive categories:
• Sort sorts a set of records that have been distributed into S partitions
and is inherently network-intensive [9].
• WordCount computes the frequency of occurrence of each word in
a large corpus and reports the ten most common words. WordCount
performs extensive data reduction on its inputs, so it is CPU-intensive
and transfers very little data over the network [9, 17].
• RandomWriter randomly chooses words from a small vocabulary
(100 words) and forms them into lines in Map task. The map out-
puts are directly committed to the distributed ﬁle system, so there is
no Reduce task in RandomWriter. RandomWriter is I/O-intensive [17].
3.3.4 Proﬁling
Since our testbed is set up on Amazon AWS [18], we have used the Amazon
CloudWatch [19] service to monitor AWS cloud resources. Amazon Cloud-
Watch monitors AWS resources such as Amazon EC2, and with it, one can
gain system-wide visibility into resource utilization, application performance,
and operational health [19].
3.3.5 Evaluation Metrics
We can use various metrics to measure the impacts of failures on diﬀerent
application types. As diﬀerent applications have diﬀerent properties, our
FSaaS service can use more than one metric. Some commonly used metrics
in large-scale networks are as follows:
• Makespan: total time taken by an experiment until the last job com-
pletes.
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Table 3.1: Amazon EC2 Instance Specs
Memory 1.7 GB
EC2 Compute Unit 1
Storage 160 GB
Platform 32-bit or 64-bit
I/O Performance Moderate
API name m1.small
• System Normalized Performance (SNP): the geometric mean of
all the ANP values for the jobs in an experiment, where ANP stands
for the “Application Normalized Performance” of a job [20].
• Slowdown norm: some scaled lp norms of the slowdown factors of
the jobs across each experiment [9].
• Data Transfer (DT): the total amount of data transferred by all
tasks during an experiment. DT is split into 3 components: data read
from local disk, data transfer across a rack switch, and data transfer
across the central switch.
In this paper we have used Makespan for evaluations. We intend to use
additional metrics in future work.
3.3.6 Testbed Description
For our testbed, we used Amazon Web Services (AWS) [18] EC2 machines
and ran MapReduce jobs through the AWS Elastic MapReduce service. AWS
is a widely used Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) for running cloud services
and it simpliﬁes the setting up of Hadoop clusters to run MapReduce jobs
through the Elastic MapReduce service. AWS provides a highly scalable
infrastructure, which is essential for our experiments.
We set up our Hadoop cluster with 10 AWS EC2 machines. Each machine
was a standard small instance type. Table 3.1 gives details on that instance
type.
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3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results gathered from our experiments and dis-
cuss the data that led to the creation of the failure scenarios. As stated in Sec-
tion 3.3, we gathered a variety of diﬀerent failures that could happen inside
a Hadoop cluster and injected them into diﬀerent Hadoop jobs. The Hadoop
jobs we selected represented three diﬀerent types of workloads, namely I/O-
intensive, CPU-intensive, and network-intensive. Those workloads put heavy
pressure on diﬀerent resources within a Hadoop cluster; hence, we can use
them to identify better set of failures that have larger impacts in these dif-
ferent failure scenarios. Our results show that the behavior of each of the
workloads under our failure scenarios varied signiﬁcantly according to the
type of workload. In our experiments, we chose the following three Hadoop
jobs: Random Writer, Hadoop Sort, and Word Count. They correspond to
I/O-intensive, network-intensive, and CPU-intensive workloads, respectively.
Initially, we observed the impacts of diﬀerent failures on diﬀerent Hadoop
jobs. First, we implemented the following failures in AnarchyApe [13]: kill
nodes, disconnect network for duration of period, slow down network for
duration of period, fork bomb at a particular node, and drop network packets
for duration of period at a certain rate. Second, we ran our three diﬀerent
types of Hadoop jobs many times, each time with one of the above failures
injected. Our goal in the experiments was to determine the impact levels of
the above failures on the diﬀerent job types.
In Figure 3.1, bars “None” through “Packet Drop” show job completion
times for Word Count, Random Writer, and Sort Hadoop jobs with injection
of diﬀerent failures. We can see that diﬀerent failures had diﬀerent levels of
impact on the completion times of the Hadoop jobs. The “None” bars show
the Hadoop job completion time with no failures. When no failures were in-
jected, the Word Count job took, on average, about 40 minutes. For a “Kill
One Node” injection, one of the Hadoop nodes was terminated during the
execution. Killing one node during the execution did not aﬀect the running
time at all. This shows that for CPU-intensive jobs, Hadoop is well-built to
recover from individual node failures without loss of computation time. In
a “Network Disconnect” failure, we brought down the network interface for
a few minutes in several nodes. In the “Network Slow” failure, we slowed
down network packets for a few milliseconds at a few nodes. In a “Fork
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Figure 3.1: Job durations for Word Count, Random Writer, and Sort under
diﬀerent failure scenarios.
Bomb” failure, we started a fork bomb at a few Hadoop nodes. Finally, in
the “Packet Drop” failure, we dropped a particular percentage of packets at
several Hadoop nodes. These additional failures had a signiﬁcant impact on
completion time, Fork Bomb being the worst culprit. For a network-intensive
workload (Sort), Network Disconnect and Packet Drop had surprisingly little
impact on job completion times. After further investigation, we discovered
that the Sort job has many bursty network communications, so Packet Drop
and Network Disconnect failures may not have a big impact unless they occur
during times of bursty network communication. For the I/O-intensive work-
load, Random Writer, there were no failures that aﬀected the job completion
time signiﬁcantly more than others. The last column shows the combination
of the top three failures for each job.
Figure 3.2 shows the remaining map tasks measured against time for the
Word Count, Sort, and Random Writer Hadoop jobs. The slope of the lines
gives us some insight into how Hadoop handles failures as they are being
injected. For Word Count, the lines are fairly level for the Network Slow
and Network Disconnect failure injections, meaning that Hadoop did not do
anything to help when those failures occurred, and that the failures caused
a steady increase in completion time for each map task. The Fork Bomb
data show exactly what we suspected. The more horizontal part of the
graph shows that for a period of 7 minutes, no map tasks were completed,
20
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 500
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70
R
em
ai
ni
ng
 M
ap
 T
as
ks
Duration (minutes)
Remaining Map Tasks for WordCount
No fault
Kill one node
Network disconnect
Fork bomb
Network slow
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16
R
em
ai
ni
ng
 M
ap
 T
as
ks
Duration (minutes)
Remaining Map Tasks for Hadoop Sort
No fault
Kill one node
Network disconnect
Fork bomb
Network slow
Network packet drop
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
R
em
ai
ni
ng
 M
ap
 T
as
ks
Duration (minutes)
Remaining Map Tasks for Random Writer
No fault
Kill one node
Network disconnect
Fork bomb
Network slow
Network packet drop
Figure 3.2: Remaining Map tasks for Word Count, Sort, and Random
Writer.
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severely degrading the performance of the jobs. For Random Writer jobs,
the remaining map tasks were aﬀected diﬀerently by the diﬀerent failure
injections, but they all ended up leveling out to similar results towards the
end.
After identifying failures with the most impact on each of the diﬀerent
jobs, we proceeded to inject combinations of failures into each of the jobs.
For each job (Word Count, Random Writer, and Sort), we selected three
of the failures with the most impact on that job and injected combinations
of these three failures to observe the resulting behavior. For Word Count
jobs, we injected a combination of Network Disconnect, Network Slow, and
Fork Bomb failures. For Random Writer, we injected Network Disconnect,
Fork Bomb, and Packet Drop. Finally, for Sort jobs, we injected Kill Node,
Network Slow, and Fork Bomb failures. Interestingly, the Word Count job
completed in less time compared to completion times under the three failures
injected individually and separately. The most reasonable explanation is that
failures have diﬀerent impacts depending on the times they are injected in
relation to the status of the running jobs, which relates to the Hadoop job
phases at the moment of injection. On the other hand, and as expected, the
Random Writer and Sort jobs took longer to complete under the combination
of failures than under any individual failures.
In review, even though we did not experiment with a huge number of ap-
plications, our study does show that application behavior varies considerably,
depending on the type of job and the phase of the job that is executing when
a failure occurs.
Now, we study potential opportunities of masking failures in single MapRe-
duce jobs and DAG jobs. Our evaluation consists of empirically analyzing
the impact of failures on MapReduce job duration and ﬁnding the worst case
situations were failure has highest impact on makespan.
Our testbed is a 10 node Hadoop cluster on phoenix.illinois.edu cluster.
Each node has 2 processing core, 6 GB of memory and 30 GB of SSD. We
have stored 3.8 GB of Twitter data, total of 516474 tweets on HDFS streamed
by Flume from Twitter Streaming API.
Our MapReduce jobs are generated by Hive queries. The ﬁrst analysis is
on a simple Hive query select count(*) from tweets; this query is equivalent
of MapReduce WordCount and will generate Mapers on each datanode then
runs one reducer in order to combine the results.
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Figure 3.3: select count(*) behavior under various time diﬀerent failure
injections.
Figure 3.4a illustrates various Map Reduce failure-free phases of this query
over time. Each datanode runs one Mapper and after all the mappers are
done one datanode will be responsible for the last count of tweets. The
failure-free execution time is around 90 second, however, with node failure
after 20 second in ﬁgure 3.4b and after 60 seconds in ﬁgure 3.4c, job comple-
tion time will dramatically increase.
In our setup, we have one TaskTracker in each datanode. TaskTracker
sends a heartbeat messages to the JobTracker, by default the timeout for
TaskTracker to be considered Killed is 10 minutes; since the scale of our
experiments is much smaller in our setup we have changed this value to 15
seconds by overriding the parameter mapred.tasktracker.expiry.interval. This
could be also seen in the ﬁgures as the JobTracker has waited 15 seconds
before recovering the failed node.
From Figure 3.3, we can see one important factor in job completion time
under failure is the time in which a failure has been injected. The Figure
shows results of 37 diﬀerent fault injections; each point represents the time
at which a failure has been injected and its eﬀect on its makespan under that
failure. It is clear that, if a failure occurs at later stages of a MapReduce job
it will take longer time for that job to ﬁnish; one reason is results of already
calculated mappers are inaccessible, therefore, JobTracker has to re-schedule
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those tasks, when as if the failure occurs at earlier stages there is more time
to recover failed tasks. This could potentially gives us a good estimate of an
upper bound of job’s makespan under failure.
From this observation, we can see that if a failure occurs toward the end of
a single job, there is not much opportunity to mask the extra latency caused
by the failure.
3.5 Conclusion
Failure in the cloud is a normal occurrence now, and ensuring that an applica-
tion can withstand large and widespread failure is essential for the longevity
of the service. Hadoop has seen many diﬀerent types of applications across
industry and academia, and, like other cloud services, it needs to be tested
against diﬀerent types of failures. Running an FSaaS against Hadoop ap-
plications can help to identify failure vulnerabilities in those applications,
allowing developers to ﬁx them and provide better service.
Services running in the cloud are diﬃcult to test using traditional meth-
ods. Having a background service continually causing diﬀerent parts of the
infrastructure to fail would go a long way towards identifying faults in a
running application on a production environment. One of the reasons it is
diﬃcult to test at such a large scale is that the number of failures that can
occur at any one time is very large. We have presented a system for proﬁling
Hadoop applications in an attempt to narrow down the testing strategy and
allow for a Hadoop application to be failure-tested as eﬃciently as possible.
Such testing can serve two purposes. One is to identify weak spots in an
application and attempt to ﬁx them. The other is to identify the quantity of
running cloud resources you need to stave oﬀ complete failure in the event
of isolated system crashes.
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(a) Failure-free execution
(b) A failure after 20 s
(c) A failure after 60 s
Figure 3.4: MapReduce execution scenarios with failure for select count(*)
Hive query.
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Chapter 4
PERFORMANCE OF DEADLINE-DRIVEN
MAPREDUCE JOBS
4.1 Motivation
The motivation of this study comes from the increasingly strict latency
requirements for data-intensive jobs. In our world today, a couple of mi-
croseconds faster could result in a huge ﬁnancial gain. For example, High-
Frequency Trading (HFT) trades, which accounted for approximately 50% of
all US equity trading volume in 2012 [21], have decreased the execution time
from several seconds in 2000 to several milli- and even microseconds in 2010
[22]. In order to make that kind of lighting fast and risky decision, a huge
volume of data coming from many sources needs to be accurately processed.
A small delay would take away millions of dollars.
Current technologies, particularly Cloud Computing and parallel job pro-
cessing frameworks (e.g., MapReduce [5] and Dryad [23]), are considered
new key ingredients for winners in this speeding race. Many parallel clus-
ters based on these frameworks have been used in production systems, which
serve real-time, recurring, and business-critical jobs [24]. However, there are
still many major roadblocks before these technologies can be faster adopted
to replace existing in-house server farms and software. One of them is the
current lack of eﬀective latency-assurance techniques for parallel jobs.
The latency of current parallel job processing frameworks is sensitive to
failures [25, 26], which are the norm rather than the exception in nowadays
large-scale data centers [27, 28]. There are many sources of failure in data
centers, namely hardware failure, software failure, and malicious attacks. In
addition, commodity hardware is seeing increasing use in data center, which
largely increase the component failure rates. For example, Google reports
the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of computer nodes in a studied cluster
was only 4.3 months [28].
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Previous studies, in the area of automating resource allocation for parallel
jobs, such as [29] and [30] address the problem of inferring and allocating
resource for MapReduce and Hive/Pig programs to meet the SLO. However,
these studies do not take into account failures which might interrupt their
models. Ferguson et al. present a system call Jockey [31], which also aims
providing latency guaranteeing for parallel jobs. In order to compensate for
potential future failures, Jockey conservatively allocates additional resources
at the start, however, this approach is unnecessary when no failure occurs.
In this chapter, we describe some adjustments to previous models in order
to account for failures. In Chapter 3, we analyzed various outcomes of failure
over latency sensitive jobs. we studied potential opportunities of masking
failures in single MapReduce jobs and DAG jobs; based on our founding,
scheduler possible reactions against partially failed jobs are: kill the job and
start over; or, allocate more recovery resources to the partially failed job or
the next jobs in the DAG. In this chapter We will study the second option
in more details, we propose our reactive strategies to deal with failures. The
idea is we increase allocated resources to a job (i.e., increase the numbers of
map and/or reduce slots) on-the-ﬂy only when a failure is detected. Hence,
if no failure is detected, with the optimally allocated resources, the job will
ﬁnish by the deadline. In case a failure is detected, the scheduler will re-
estimate the necessary resource to make up the lost time caused by failure
in order to meet the the deadline.
We propose a reactive solution to mask the eﬀect of failures for MapReduce
jobs. Speciﬁcally, our solution consists of two strategies, which are applied
in order:
• Reactively increasing resource allocation for a single parallel job when
a failure happens to compensate for the extra latency caused by the
failure. If the extra latency cannot be masked, i.e., the job misses its
own deadline, the strategy is considered failed, then the next strategy
is applied.
• Reactively increasing resource allocation for the next phase in the DAG
of parallel jobs. In case there is no good solution that can completely
mask the extra latency, the next strategy is applied.
Our proposal is based on [29] to estimate the completion time of MapRe-
duce jobs in the presence of failures. The completion time models take the
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number of allocated resources (i.e., map and reduce slots) as parameters to
output the estimated completion time. This model can be inversely solved
to ﬁnd the appropriate resource (number of map and reduce slots) to satisfy
a given deadline - a predeﬁned completion time. Our newly adjusted models
require parameters such as delay time caused by failures in diﬀerent phases
of MapReduce job. We use FSaaS, discussed in Chapter 3 to obtain these
parameters.
We ﬁrst review ARIA completion time estimation model. Next, for each
strategy we discuss a completion time estimation model. Later, we motivate
the inverse problem, with which we reactively obtain estimates of the resource
allocation for MapReduce jobs given their deadlines, after failure occurrence.
4.2 Review ARIA
ARIA [29] provides a model to estimate the lower and upper bounds on the
completion time of MapReduce jobs. A basic block of ARIA’s model is the
makespan theorem to determine the performance bounds for a given set of
n tasks that is processed by k servers. Each server can process only one
task at a time. In a MapReduce environment, a task could be a map task
or a reduce task, a server could be a map slot or a reduce slot, respectively.
Let T1, T 2,..., T n be the duration of n tasks. The assignment of tasks to
servers is done using a simple, online, greedy algorithm: assign each task to
the server with earliest ﬁnishing time. Let avg and max be the average and
maximum duration of the n task respectively.
The makespan theorem says: the makespan (or completion time) of the
greedy task assignment is at least:
T low =
n.avg
k
,
and at most:
T up =
(n− 1)avg
k
+max
servers.
This theorem can be applied to compute the completion time range of each
phase of a MapReduce job, given the average and maximum bounds can be
obtained from proﬁling or analyzing past execution logs. A MapReduce job
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is divided into three phases: map (T lowM , T
up
M ), shuﬄe/sort (T
Sh
low, T
up
Sh), and
reduce (T lowR , T
up
R ). Due to the fact that k, the number of servers, is usually
smaller than n (number of tasks), tasks execution occur in waves: a group
of k tasks execute concurrently.
The ﬁnal formula for the lower and upper bounds of the overall completion
time of a MapReduce job J are:
T lowJ = T
low
M + Sh
avg
1 + T
low
Sh + T
low
R (4.1)
T upJ = T
up
M + Sh
max
1 + T
up
Sh + T
up
R (4.2)
Shavg1 and Sh
max
1 are the average and maximum non-overlapping portions of
the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave. These parameters can be obtained from proﬁling or
past executions.
Based on this equation, the inverse problem can be solved to obtain esti-
mates of the resource allocation for MapReduce jobs given their deadlines.
4.3 Reactive Latency Masking for a Single MapReduce
job
This section describes our solution to reactively increase the resource to cope
with failures in a single parallel job. In order to do that, we need to under-
stand how failures aﬀect parallel jobs, particularly their completion times.
The discussion uses MapReduce model, but we believe it could be generalize
to other parallel job models, which also have dependencies between execution
phases.
We use ARIA model [29] to analyze the eﬀects of failures when they happen
in diﬀerent phases of MapReduce jobs. Based on the analysis, we introduce
a solution based on speculative execution to mask failures, which occur early
in MapReduce executions.
4.3.1 Eﬀects of Failures on the Completion Time of parallel
jobs
This sections analyzes the eﬀects of failures that terminate or delay only one
single task in a MapReduce job. This analysis can be generalized for failures
29
(a) Failure-free execution (b) A failure in Map wave 1
(c) A failure in Map wave 2 (d) A failure in Shuﬄe wave 1
(e) A failure in Shuﬄe wave 2 (f) A failure in Reduce wave 1
Figure 4.1: MapReduce execution scenarios with three map slots and three
reduce slots (red texts show waves that are aﬀected by failures)
that aﬀects multiple tasks.
Failures Aﬀecting Map Phase
This section analyzes the eﬀects of failures that occur in map phase of MapRe-
duce jobs. Figure 4.1b and 4.1c illustrate two examples of failures occurring
in map tasks. We consider the execution time of a wave (could be either map,
shuﬄe, or reduce wave) is the non-overlapping time after the previous phase
ﬁnishes until all the tasks in the wave ﬁnish. In failure-free execution, tasks
in a same wave tend to ﬁnish close together, therefore the overlapping por-
tion between two consecutive waves is often small. However, in an execution
aﬀected by a failure, the overlapping time is the additional time incurred by
the failure (i.e., failure detection and task re-execution time).
When a map task experiences a failure, the time incurred by the failure
is counted toward the wave that the map task belongs to. The completion
time of other waves can still be estimated by the method described in Section
4.2. Let T failM denote the additional time added by the failure to the overall
completion time of the map phase. T failM can be obtained by performing fault
injections to Map tasks.
The completion time of the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave is also aﬀected by the failure.
Recall that the completion time of the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave is the non-overlapping
time of the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave with the map phase. The overall completion time
of the map phase changes, therefore overlapping portion of the map phase
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and the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave changes as well. Consequently, the non-overlapping
time portion of the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave have to change. Let Sh’max1 denote the
non-overlapping time of the ﬁrst shuﬄe wave in an execution aﬀected by
failures.
The completion time of other shuﬄe waves and map waves remain the
same because of the strict barriers between these waves.
Equation 4.2 is adjusted as follows when a failure is present in Map tasks:
T �upJ = T
up
M + T
fail
M + Sh
�max
1 + T
up
Sh + T
up
R (4.3)
The added time caused by a failure in map phase to the overall completion
time of the MapReduce job j is
�TMfailJ = T failM + Sh�max1 − Shmax1 (4.4)
Failures Aﬀecting Shuﬄe Phase
This section analyzes the eﬀects of failures that occur in shuﬄe phase of
MapReduce jobs. Figure 4.1d and 4.1d illustrate two examples of failures
occurring in shuﬄe phases. Since the shuﬄe phases only use output of the
map phases, failures in the shuﬄe phases do not aﬀect the map phases. A
shuﬄe phase has a strict barrier with the next reduce phase. Therefore,
failures in the shuﬄe phases do not aﬀect the completion time (in term of
the length) of the the reduce phase.
Let T failSh denote the additional time added by the failure to the overall
completion time of the shuﬄe phase. Equation 4.2 is adjusted as follows
when a failure is present in shuﬄe phases:
T �upJ = T
up
M + Sh
�max
1 + T
up
Sh + T
fail
Sh + T
up
R (4.5)
The added time caused by a failure in shuﬄe phase to the overall comple-
tion time of the MapReduce job j is
�T ShfailJ = T failSh (4.6)
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Failures Aﬀecting Map Phase
This section analyzes the eﬀects of failures that occur in reduce phase of
MapReduce jobs. Figure 4.1f illustrates an examples of failures occurring in
a map phase. Similar to shuﬄe phase, failures in reduce phase do not aﬀect
neither map phase nor shuﬄe phase.
Let T failR denote the additional time added by the failure to the overall
completion time of the reduce phase. Equation 4.2 is adjusted as follows
when a failure is present in reduce phases:
T �upJ = T
up
M + Sh
�max
1 + T
up
Sh + T
up
R + T
fail
R (4.7)
The added time caused by a failure in reduce phase to the overall completion
time of the MapReduce job j is
�TRfailJ = T failR (4.8)
We need to obtain T failM , Sh’
max
1 , T
fail
Sh , and T
fail
R (i.e., via fault injection) in
order to predict the job completion time under failures. These parameters
will be obtained by proﬁling applications using FSaaS. Once these parameters
are obtained, we could also develop strategies to allocate resources to allow
MapReduce jobs still meet deadlines even when failures happen.
4.3.2 Masking Failure with Speculative Execution
Figure 4.2: Utilizing speculative execution to mitigate the eﬀects of failures
in MapReduce jobs
The ﬁrst strategy is to speed up the MapReduce job that experiences fail-
ure. Figure 4.2 illustrates how this strategy works. When a failure is detected
in a map phase, we utilize speculative execution to launch all tasks in the
next waves together when their scheduled times come, regardless of the un-
availability of the slot that is executing the failure-aﬀected task.
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4.4 Reactive Latency Masking for a DAG job
This section describes our solution to reactively increase the resource to cope
with failures in a DAG of parallel jobs.
(a) Failure-free execution of a DAG
job (b) Failure in a DAG job
(c) Dynamically increase resource to
make of the lost time due to the
failure
Figure 4.3: Failure in a DAG job
We use the model proposed by [30] to analyze the eﬀects of failures on
DAG jobs. From the analysis, we ﬁnd that some failures can be masked
by the concurrency nature of DAG jobs. In case a failure does aﬀect the
overall latency of the DAG job, we propose to reactively re-estimate the
resource needed to speed up the rest of jobs in DAG. Figure 4.3c illustrates
this strategy.
The next sections present our failure analysis of DAG jobs.
4.4.1 Model DAG jobs
A DAG job consists of multiple parallel jobs executing in stages. The struc-
ture of the execution plan, including both concurrent and sequential branches,
can be expressed by a DAG of parallel jobs. Figure 4.4 shows an example of
DAG execution plan. The plan consists of seven MapReduce jobs {j1, j2, j3,
j4, j5, j6, j7}.
Due to the dependencies between jobs (expressed by edges in DAG), MapRe-
duce jobs in a plan execute in stages. Jobs in a same stage can be executed
concurrently. A job can only be started when all jobs of previous stages have
ﬁnished. In the example shown in ﬁgure 4.4, there are ﬁve execution stages:
• ﬁrst stage {j1};
• second stage {j2, j3};
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Figure 4.4: A ﬁve-stage DAG job
• third stage {j4, j5};
• forth stage {j6};
• ﬁfth stage {j7};
4.4.2 Estimate Completion Time of Failure-free DAG jobs
It is trivial that the completion time of each DAG job is the summation of
the completion times of all its stages. Let T Si denote the completion time of
the stage S i. The completion time of a S stages DAG job can be estimated
as follows:
TP =
�
1≤i≤S
TSi (4.9)
It is, however, non-trivial to estimate the completion time of each individ-
ual stage due to the concurrency jobs. Even more challenging, the comple-
tion time depends on the jobs’ execution orders, which by default is non-
deterministic in many execution engines (e.g., Pig and Hive). [30] proposes
that given the ability to estimate the completion time of each individual par-
allel job in a stage, it is possible to determine an optimal execution order for
a stage, such as using Johnson’s algorithm [32]. With the optimal execution
order, [30] proposes the following model for estimating the completion time
of a stage. Let:
• {J 1, J 2, ...J |Si|} be the optimal execution order of jobs in stage S i;
• SMJi be the start time of job J i’s map phase;
• EMJi be the end time of job J i’s map phase;
• SRJi be the start time of job J i’s reduce phase;
• ERJi be the end time of job J i’s reduce phase.
Then the stage completion time is:
TSi = E
R
J|Si|
− SMJ1 (4.10)
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(a) Failure-free execution of a stage
in DAG job (b) Failure in a stage in DAG job
Figure 4.5: A failure that is masked by the concurrent executions of jobs in
a DAG stage
(a) Failure-free execution of a stage
in a DAG job (b) Failure in a stage in a DAG job
Figure 4.6: A failure caused increasing the completion time of a DAG stage
Let TMJi and T
R
Ji
denote the completion times of the map and reduce phases
of job J i. Then the end time of map and reduce phases can be estimated as
follows:
EMJi = S
M
Ji
+ TMJi (4.11)
ERJi = S
R
Ji
+ TRJi (4.12)
In an optimal order, a map phase can start right after the map phase of the
previous job ﬁnishes. But the reduce phase can only start after both the
reduce phase of the previous job and its map phase ﬁnish. Figure 4.6a and
Figure 4.5a illustrate two examples of this relation. Thus, the start times of
map and reduce phases can be estimated as follows:
SMJi = E
M
Ji−i (4.13)
SRJi = max{EMJi , ERJi−i} (4.14)
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4.4.3 Estimate the Completion Time of DAG Jobs under
Failures
Failure in a stage of a DAG job
When a failure occurs in a MapReduce job, it will increase the completion
time of that job as analyzed in section 4.3.1. This section analyzes how this
increasing aﬀects the the completion time a a stage in DAG.
Let consider a failure occurs in themap phase of job J i. The new estimated
end time of the map phase is:
E �MJi = E
M
Ji
+�TMfailJ (4.15)
The start time of the reduce phase of job J i is aﬀected as follows:
S �RJi = max{E �
M
Ji
, ERJi−i} (4.16)
⇔ S �RJi = max{EMJi +�TMfailJ , ERJi−i} (4.17)
Therefore:
S �RJi = S
R
Ji
⇔ EMJi +�TMfailJ ≤ ERJi−i (4.18)
⇔�TMfailJ ≤ ERJi−i − EMJi (4.19)
This means the eﬀect of the failure in the map phase could be masked (i.e.,
show no eﬀect on the overall completion time of the stage) if the condition
(4.19) is satisﬁed: in the failure-free execution, the end time of the reduce
phase of the previous job is suﬃciently later than the end time of the map
phase of the current job. Figure 4.5 illustrates a scenario when condition
(4.19) is satisﬁed between to jobs. Figure 4.6 illustrates a scenario when
condition (4.19) is not satisﬁed causing an increase in the overall completion
time of two jobs.
However, when a failure occurs in a shuﬄe phase or in a map phase, it
always results in an increase in the overall completion time of the stage.
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4.5 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presented our initial study toward the design and implementa-
tion of a tool that can provide latency-guarantee for MapReduce jobs in the
presence of failures. The tool is a combination of two strategies which aim
at masking the latency eﬀect of failures at diﬀerent levels. First, the tool
attempts to mask the latency-eﬀect in each single parallel job that suﬀers
the failure. When the ﬁrst strategy fails, the second strategy is applied to
mask the latency by increasing resources for other parallel jobs in the next
phases of the DAG jobs.
For each strategy we discussed a completion time estimation model. In
future work, we use this model to build an inverse problem, with which we
can reactively obtain estimates of the resource allocation for MapReduce jobs
given their deadlines, after failure occurrence.
We believe that our solutions will result in a better overall resource uti-
lization for MapReduce jobs frameworks.
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